NEWS that the cost of recapitalising Aurigny will contribute to Guernsey’s proposed national debt comes at the same time as the Treasury minister is questioning its continued public ownership.

That’s understandable: few governments these days would choose to own an airline in the way which was commonplace 30 years ago.

But Guernsey’s case is unique.

The island’s economy is hugely dependent on the range of industries described by the umbrella term ‘finance’. Good transport links to London are a key requirement of this engine of our economy. For that, we need slots at the key London airports for use on the Guernsey route. We all know that London’s airports are operating at full stretch, hence the controversy surrounding attempts to increase their capacity.

Extra runways are being talked about at Gatwick and Heathrow and some even favour a brand new London airport. Even if these projects overcome planning and environmental hurdles, it will be many years before the extra capacity comes on line.

In the meantime, slots at Gatwick will be at a great premium. That means there is a real danger that airlines with no inherent loyalty, other than to shareholders, could be tempted to sell their Gatwick slots or swap them for other more-lucrative routes. After all, that is just what happened when we lost our Heathrow service due to a purely commercial decision by an airline which had promised long-term commitment to Guernsey.

The facts haven’t changed since the States bought Aurigny. The only way to guarantee our Gatwick slots is to own them. Governments can’t own slots so the States has to own an airline which owns them.

Even if there was some legal way to guarantee that Flybe continued to use its Gatwick slots on the Guernsey route (and there isn’t), it is inconceivable that prices wouldn’t rise if there were a sole operator.

So, on balance, the status quo should continue for the time being despite the current cost and the risk of future losses.

Selling Aurigny is too risky strategically and in the current market conditions we would struggle to find a buyer even if we wanted to. The hope must be that our ‘nationalised’ airline can ride the eventual upturn with its new aircraft and trade its way out of debt.

That means the States needs to take great care. The first thing is not to allow a state-owned airline to become a state-run airline. The management must be a commercial one, at arm’s length, with no government interference.

So far the States has been very good at resisting the temptation to meddle, the only exception being Deputy Lowe’s daft calls for the free cuppa and Guernsey Press to be withdrawn.

That would save a few thousand pounds but would jeopardise goodwill, which couldn’t be bought by advertising costing 10 times that amount. States members simply have to keep their noses out.

Even more importantly, as an airline owner, the States must immediately stop being the body which licenses routes.

Flybe objects and suggests the arrangement favours Aurigny. Whether that belief is sincerely held or used to put pressure on the licensing authority is a moot point, but its objection in principle is unanswerable.

Aurigny is equally convinced, and I tend to agree, that perversely it sometimes seems to lose out as Commerce and Employment bends over backwards to be seen not to favour it.

A classic example is the Manchester route. It is inconceivable that an independent licensing authority would allow Flybe to ‘cherry pick’ the summer trade while Aurigny maintains a year-round service.

The sooner an independent licensing body is set up, the better. Not an expensive quango but a simple, cost-effective panel of those able and willing to consider the limited number of applications thoughtfully and independently.

The alternative of scrapping licensing altogether in favour of an ‘open skies’ policy sounds attractive but in reality would lead to more cherry-picking and fewer sustainable links.

Lastly, the community must be kept fully up to date on all the costs of owning Aurigny. Let’s be realistic – these may be significant over the next couple of difficult years.

Will it be as high as the cost to our community of not owning it? There must be a level of losses beyond which the island will not go, despite the huge strategic issues involved.

To make that difficult judgement, we need to be kept fully informed.